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The Effect of National Standards
and Curriculum-Based Exams on Achievement
Two presidents, the National Governors Association and numerous blue ribbon panels
have called for the development of state or national content standards for core subjects and
examinations that assess the achievement of these standards.  The Competitiveness Policy
Council, for example, advocates that "ex ernal assessments be given to individual students at the
secondary level and that the results should be a major but not exclusive factor qualifying for
college and better jobs at better wages (1993, p. 30)."   It is claimed that curriculum-based
external exit exam systems (CBEEEs) based on world class content standards will improve
teaching and learning of core subjects.  What evidence is there for this claim?  Outside the
United States such systems are the rule, not the exception.  What impacts have such systems
had on school policies, teaching and student learning?
Let us begin by defining what is meant by a system of curriculum-based external exit
examinations (CBEEE).  A CBEEE has the following traits.  It:
1. Produces signals of student accomplishment that have real consequences for the
student. 
2. Defines achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other students in
the classroom or the school.  Fair comparisons of achievement across schools and
across students at different schools are now possible.  Costrell's (1994a, b) analysis of the
optimal setting of educational standards concluded that more centralized standard setting
(state or national achievement exams) results in higher standards, higher achievement and
higher social welfare than decentralized standard setting (i . teacher grading or schools
graduation requirements).
3. Is organized by discipline and keyed to the content of specific course sequences. 
This focuses responsibility for preparing the student for particular exams on one (or a small
group of) teacher/s.
4. Signals multiple levels of achievement in the subject.  If only a pass-fail signal is
generated by an exam, the standard will have to be set low enough to allow almost
everyone to pass and this will not stimulate the great bulk of students to greater effort
(Kang 1985; Costrell 1994a, b).
5. Covers almost all secondary school students.  Exams for a set of elite schools or for
those specializing in a particular field will influence standards in that segment but may
have limited effects on the bulk of students.  A single exam taken by all is not essential. 
Some nations offer high and intermediate level exams in the same subject. 
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Curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs) improve the signalling of academic
achievement.  As a result, colleges and employers are likely to give greater weight to academic
achievement when they make admission and hiring decisions, so the rewards for learning should
grow and become more visible.  CBEEEs also shift attention towards measures of absolute
achievement and away from measures of relative achievement such as rank in class and teacher
grades.
Grading on a curve or basing college admissions on class rank gives students a personal
interest in persuading each other not to study.   The studious are called nerds, in part, because
they are making it more difficult for others to get top grades.  When exams are graded on a
curve, joint welfare is maximized when no one studies.  In the repeated game that results, side
payments--friendship and respect--and punishments--ridicule and harassment--enforce the
cooperative "don't study" solution.  When, by contrast, learning is assessed relative to an outside
standard, students no longer have a personal interest in getting teachers off track or persuading
each other to refrain from studying.
In the absence of CBEEEs, school reputations are largely outside the control of school
staff; determined instead by the social class of the student body, mean SAT scores and by
numbers attending prestigious colleges.  When a CBEEE is in place, exam results displace
social class as the primary determinant of school reputations and this in turn should induce
school staff to give enhanced learning higher priority.  Teachers will upgrade curricula and assign
more homework; school administrators will hire more qualified teachers and increase the time
devoted to examination subjects; parents will demand better science labs and more rigorous
teaching.
Do CBEEEs Increase Achievement of 13 year olds? A look at the Evidence.
The hypothesis that curriculum-based external exit examination systems improve
achievement will be tested by comparing nations (and provinces) that do and do not have such
systems.
Third International Mathematics and Science Study--TIMSS:  The just released TIMSS
provides 1994-95 data for 7th and 8th graders for 39 countries.  Comparative education studies
and education encyclopedias were reviewed and embassy personnel interviewed to determine
which of the TIMSS nations have curriculum-based externally-set exit examinations in secondary
school.  Nineteen national school systems were classified as having CBEEEs for both subjects in
all parts of the country: Bulgaria, Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia,
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Scotland, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Thailand.  Four countries--France, Iceland,
Norway and Romania--had CBEEEs in mathematics but not in science.  Five countries--
Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States--had CBEEEs in some provinces
but not in others.  The countries classified as not having a CBEEE in either subject were
Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Philippines, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.  Following Madeus
and Kelleghan (1991), the university entrance examinations in Greece, Portugal Spain and
Cyprus were not considered to be CBEEEs.  University entrance exams should have much
smaller effects because students headed into the job market do not take them and teachers can
avoid responsibility for their student's success.  Disappointing results can be blamed on
shortages of university places or the recondite standards of the exam.
Policies regarding age of entry into school and grade retention vary across countries, so
comparisons must hold student age constant, not grade in school.  Consequently, the dependent
variable for this analysis is the median test score for the nation's 13 year olds (Beat n et al,
1996a,b, Table 1.5).  For countries not included in this table, the 13 year old median was
estimated by age adjusting the mean for 7th graders.  The median math and science test scores
were regressed on per capita gross domestic product for 1987 and 1990 deflated by a
purchasing power parity price index, a dummy for East Asian nation and a dummy for CBEEE. 
The results presented in Table 1 indicate that test scores are significantly higher in more
developed nations, East Asian nations and in nations with a CBEEE.  The impact of a CBEEE is
about one U.S. grade level equivalent in mathematics and 1.2 grade level equivalents in science.
International Assessment of Educational Progress-1991: The 1991 International
Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) is the second data set in which CBEEE effects can
be tested.  Fifteen nations are available for the analysis: England, France, Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Emilia Romagna/Northern Italy, Korea, Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Spain,
Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States. 
The average percent correct (adjusted for guessing) for 13 year old students was
regressed on the same set of variables as in the analysis of the TIMSS data.  The results are
presented in the second panel of Table 1.  For mathematics the effect of curriculum-based
external exams is highly significant and quite large.  Since the U.S. standard deviation was 26.8
percentage points in mathematics, the CBEEE effect on math was more than one-half of a U.S.
standard deviation or about 2 U.S. grade level equivalents.  CBEEEs had a smaller non-
significant effect on science achievement.  East Asian students scored significantly higher than
students in Europe and North America.  Coefficients on per capita GDP were positive but not
statistically significant. 
Canada--IAEP Data: In 1990-91, the year the IAEP data was being collected, Alberta,
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British Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec and Francophone New Brunswick had curriculum-
based provincial examinations in English, French, mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics
during the senior year of high school.  These exams accounted for 50 percent of that year's final
grade in Alberta, Newfoundland and Quebec and 40 percent in British Columbia.  The other
provinces had no curriculum-based provincial examinations in 1990-91.  Ontario eliminated them
in 1967, Manitoba in 1970 and Nova Scotia in 1972.  Anglophone New Brunswick had provincial
exams in language arts and mathematics but exam grades were not reported on transcripts or
counted in final course grades. 
The principals of schools sampled by IAEP completed questionnaires describing school
policies, school resources and the qualifications of 8th grade mathematics and science teachers.
 Students were asked about books in the home, number of siblings, language spoken at home,
hours of TV, hours doing homework, pleasure reading, watching science programs on TV,
parental oversight of school work and teaching methods of teachers.  
The backwash effects of curriculum-based provincial exit exams taken by 12th graders on
the behavior of Canadian 13 year olds, their parents, teachers and school administrators were
examined by estimating models predicting these behaviors using schools as observations.  The
model contained 8 variables: logarithm of the mean number of books in the home, the mean
number of siblings, the proportion of the school's students whose home language was different
from the language of instruction, logarithm of the number of students per grade in the school and
dummies for religiously controlled school, secular non-public schools, French speaking schools,
USA and EXAM province.
The estimated impacts of exit exams are presented in Table 2.  Each row represents a
separate regression on data from 1366 to 1460 schools.  The means and standard deviations
across schools of each dependent variable are presented in columns 1 and 2.  The coefficient for
EXAM and it's T statistic are presented in columns 3 and 4.  Complete results are reported in
Bishop (1996).  Provincial exit exams had very large effects on achievement: 24 percent of a
U.S. standard deviation (about four-fifths of a U.S. grade level equivalent) in mathematics and
17.6 percent of a standard deviation (about three-fifths of a grade level equivalent) in science. 
Exit exams also apparently affected the behavior of parents, teachers and school
administrators.  Parents in these provinces were more likely to talk to their children about their
math and science classes and their children were more likely to report that their parents "want
me to do well in math."  Schools in exit exam provinces scheduled more hours of math and
science instruction, assigned more homework, had better science labs, were significantly more
likely to use specialist teachers for math and science and more likely to hire math and science
teachers who had studied the subject in college.
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Opponents of externally set curriculum-based examinations predict that they will cause
students to avoid learning activities that do not enhance exam scores.  This hypothesis was
operationalized by testing whether exam systems were associated with less reading for pleasure
and less watching of science programs like NOVA and Nature.  Neither of these hypotheses is
supported.  Indeed students in exam provinces spent significantly more time reading for
pleasure, more time watching science programs on TV, while watching significantly less TV
overall.
Do CBEEEs skew teaching in undesirable ways?  Madeus has pointed out that
"preparation for high stakes tests often emphasizes rote memorization and cramming of students
and drill and practice teaching methods" and that "some kinds of teaching to the test permits
students to do well in examinations without recourse to higher levels of cognitive activity (1991 p.
7-8)."  Contrary to this hypothesis, however, students did more (not fewer) experiments in
science class and emphasis on computation using whole numbers--a skill that should be learned
by the end of 5th grade--declined significantly.   Apparently, teachers subject to the subtle
pressure of a provincial exam four years in the future adopt strategies that are conventionally
viewed as "best practice," not strategies designed to maximize scores on multiple choice tests.
One possible skeptical response to these findings is to point out that the correlation
between EXAM and other outcomes may not be causal.  Maybe the people of Alberta, British
Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec and Francophone New Brunswick--the provinces with exam
systems--place higher priority on education than the rest of the nation.  Maybe this trait also
results in greater political support for examination systems.  If so, we would expect that schools
in the EXAM provinces should be better than schools in other provinces along other dimensions
such as discipline and absenteeism, not just by academic criteria.  Bishop (1996) predicts, to the
contrary, that exam systems induce students and schools to redirect resources and attention to
learning/teaching exam subjects and away from the achievement of other goals such as low
absenteeism and good discipline.  These competing hypotheses are evaluated in the 3rd and 4th
row of Table 2.  Contrary to the "provincial taste for education" hypothesis, principals in EXIT
EXAM provinces did not report significantly fewer discipline problems and were significantly more
likely to report absenteeism problems.  
Conclusions
Our review of the evidence suggests that the claims of the advocates of standards and
examination based reform of American secondary education may be right.  The countries and
Canadian provinces with such systems outperform other countries at comparable levels of
development.  In addition, New York State, the only state with a CBEEE, does remarkably well on
the SAT test when student demography is held constant (Bishop 1996).  CBEEEs are not,
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however, the most important determinant of achievement levels.   CBEEEs are common in
developing nations where achievement levels are often quite low [eg.C lumbia and Iran]. 
Belgium, by contrast, has a top quality education system without having a CBEEE.  More 
research on the effects of CBEEEs is clearly in order.
The Effect of National Standards WP 97-01
Page 8
REFERENCES
Beaton, Albert et al. (1996) Mathematics Achievement in the Middle School Years: IEA'  Third
International Mathematics and Science Study. CSTEEP, Boston College, Boston MA.
http://www.csteep.bc.edu/TIMSS.
Beaton, Albert et al. (1996) Science Achievement in the Middle School Years: IEA's Third
International Mathematics and Science Study. CSTEEP, Boston College, Boston MA.
http://www.csteep.bc.edu/TIMSS.
Bishop, John.  (1996) "The Impact of Curriculum-Based External Examinations on School
Priorities and Student Learning."  International Journal of Education Research.
Competitiveness Policy Council, (1993) Reports of the Subcouncils, March, Washington, D.C.:
Competitiveness Policy Council.
Costrell, Robert. (1994a)  "A Simple Model of Educational Standards."  The American Economic
Review. Vol. 84, # 4, Sept., 956-971.
Costrell, Robert. (1994b)  "Centralized vs Decentralized Educational Standards Under Pooling." 
July 1994, Dept of Economics, U. of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass., 1-35.
Kang, Suk. "A Formal Model of School Reward Systems." in Incentives, Learning and
Employability, edited by John Bishop, Columbus Ohio: National Center for Research in
Vocational Education, 1985.
Madeus, George.  "The Effects of Important Tests on Students: Implications for a National
Examination or System of Examinations."  American Educational Research Association
Invitational Conference on Accountability as a State Reform Instrument, Washington,
D.C., June 1991, 1-19.
Madeus, George F. and Kellaghan, Thomas. (1991)  "Student Examination Systems in the
European Community."  Report Submitted to the Office of Technology Assessment, 1-40.
The Effect of National Standards WP 97-01
Page 9
Table 1
The Effect of Curriculum-Based External Exams
on Mathematics and Science Achievement of 13 Year Olds
(Analysis of TIMSS and IAEP data)
 ExternalLnGDP/Pop East AdjR2/
Exit Exam1987 & 90 Asia RMSE
Third International
 Math and Science Study-1994/95
Mathematics-level 23.0* 55.6*** 68.8*** .534
 (U.S. GLE = 24) (1.74) (5.61) (4.25) 35.6
Science-level 34.3*** 44.0*** 20.4 .398
 (U.S. GLE = 26) (2.77) (4.56) (1.27) 35.0
International Assessment of
 Educational Progress-1991
Mathematics % Correct 15.7***  3.7 16.1** .641
 (U.S. stdev= (3.85) ( .25) (2.81)  6.0
Science % Correct  4.3  1.7  9.6** .436
 (U.S. stdev=19.9) (1.72) ( .61) (2.81)  4.0
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Table 2--Effects of
Curriculum-Based External Exit Exams in Canada
Dep Var School Exit Exams
Mean Std Dev Coef Tstat
Achievement
Mathematics .464  .135  .061 (9.4)
Science .541  .096  .035 (7.1)
Discipline Problems .765  .720 -.009 ( .2)
 
Absenteeism Problems .822  .766  .179 (4.1)
 
School Administrator Behavior
Math Specialist Teachers .48  .50  .23 (8.8)
 
Science Specialist Teachers .49  .50  .19 (7.2)
 
Math Teacher Studied .66  .39  .19 (8.3)
  Math in Univ.
Sci. Teacher Studied .70  .38  .22 (9.9)
  Science in Univ.
Math Class Hours 3.97  .89  .37 (7.0)
Sci. Class Hours 3.00  .82  .23 (4.9)
Good Science Labs 1.95  .95  .43 (8.0)
Teacher Behavior
Total Homework Hrs/wk 4.41 1.62  .66 (7.1)
 
Emphasizes Whole 1.68  .49 -.11 (3.7)
  Number Computation
Student Do Experiments 1.52  .63  .26 (7.3)
Home Behavior & Attitudes
TV Hours/wk 14.7 2.85 -.73 (5.1)
Read for Fun Index 1.85  .28  .04 (2.8)
Watch NOVA, Nature  .97  .38  .06 (2.7)
Parents Talk about Math Class  .62  .17  .05 (5.1)
  
Parents Talk about Science Class  .47  .17  .06 (6.4)
 
Parents want me to do well in Math 3.54  .22  .06 (4.9)
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Table 2-LONG--Effects of Curriculum-Based External Exams in Canada
StdDev Curric Exam  U.S. French   Relig Indep     LnNumb LnBook   Avg.Num.    Different Adj .
Hyp. Mean   Schl Coef Tstat Speakg School School   inGrade in Home  Siblings    Hm. Lang. R2
Achievement
Mathematics + .464 .135 .061 (9.4) -.023* .074*** -.045*** .074***  .006*   .156***  -.025**   .017*      .381
Science + .541 .096 .035 (7.1 )  .020** .017** -.039*** -.016 -.006**   .119***  -.023*** -.062***     .353
Principal repts Discipline Prob 0/+ .765 .720 -.009 ( .2)  .034 .18*** -.159*** -.236** .117***  -.299    .067   -.308***     .090
Principal repts Absenteeism Prob 0/+ .822 .766 .179 (4.1)  .070 -.19*** -.068 -.288** .153***  -.411***   .165*** -.004      .122
School Administrator Behavior
Math Specialist Teachers +  .48  .50  .23 (8.8)  .47*** .07* -.201*** .057   .128***   .105***-.041   -.056      .279
Science Specialist Teachers +  .49  .50  .19 (7.2)  .35*** - .05 -.134*** .056   .167***   .152***-.028    .068      .284
Took Math Courses in Univ +  .66  .39  .19 (8.3)  .23*** - .07** -.127*** .011   -.007    .075**  .048**   -.060      .121
Took Science Courses in Univ +  .70  .38  .22 (9.9)  .15*** - .22*** -.182*** .037    .005   .064**  .013    .133***     .183
Math Class Hours + 3.97  .89  .37 (7.0)  .19*  .26***  - .028 -.095   -.088***  -.282***-.104*   -.749***     .102
Science Class Hours + 3.00  .82  .23 (4.9)  . 97*** - .11 -.415*** -.268**    .009   .009   .080   -.103      .171
Library Books per Student ?   21   21 2.48 (1.9) 5.36** 8.00*** -1.82 7.04**   -6.99***  3.73**   1.15   5.19*      .120
Computers per Student ? .052 .043 .006 (2.5)  .008* -.009* -.013* ** -.006   -.012***   .004   .004    .016**      .086
Specialized Science Labs + 1.95  .95  .43 (8.0)  .06 .000 -.251***  .256**    .216***   .110   .008    .032      .158
Hours in School Year +  949   89  1.0 (0.2) 42.6***  -10.0 -16.2***  3.7   -5.4   5.3   5.2   45.5***      .029
Class Size  - 24.8  6.1 -.38 (1.2) -2.3***  -.27 3.3***  4.4***    3.6***   .42   -.45  -2.27***      .347
Teacher Preparation Time +  .31  .27  .01 (1.5) - .01 -.03** .000  .080***  .063***   -.012   -.025**  -.042**      .192
Teacher Behavior
Total Homework--Hrs/wk + 4.41 1.62  .66 (7.1) 1.33*** - .33 .821*** 1.90***   .131***   .110   -.299***  1.024***    .168
Math Homework--Hrs/wk + 1.66  .64  .20 (5.0)  .18* - .02 .165***  .219**  -.015   .115**   -.131***  .346***     .051
Science Homework--Hrs/wk + 1.04  .47  .19 (6.3)  .12*** - .06 .125***  .051   .016   .091**   -.007    .211**      .054
Emph Whole Number Computation - 1.68  .49 - .11 (3.7) -.09  .10** -.009 -.149**  -.010   -.038   -.010    .029      .026
Math Quiz Index + 1.62  .52  .12 (4.5)  .37*** .67*** -.077***  .173**   .107***  -.040   -.006   -.113*      .394
Science Quiz Index +  .89  .38  .11 (5.3)  .66*** .32*** -.089***  .026   .024**  -.044**    .032    .147***     .336
Science Do Experiments Ind. + 1.52  .63  .26 (7.3) - .18*** .35*** .137*** -.088   .059***  -.019   -.028    .138      .165
Science Watch Experiments + 2.42  .47  .15 (5.3) - .12**  .21*** .086** -.012   .042***  -.100***  -.006   -.024      .116
Science Watch Films Index -  .94  .48 - .05 (1.7)  .31*** -.05* -.054  .004   .061***   .002    .038    .001      .070
Home Behavior & Attitudes
TV-Sch. Avg.-Hrs/wk - 14.7 2.85 - .73 (5.1)  .31 -2.0*** .50*** -2.53*** -3.48**   -.23   -.85**     .276
Read for Fun Index ? 1.85  .28  .04 (2.8) - .09*** .09*** .003 -.006     .265***    .033*    .230***     .143
Watch Science programs on TV ?  .97  .38  .06 (2.7)  .05 .24*** .071***  .028 -.094***   -.032   -.178***     .113
Parent Talk about Math Class +  .62  .17  .05 (5.1)  .08*** .03* .030***  .042*  .028**   -.029*** -.029      .043
P. Talk about Science Class +  .47  .17  .06 (6.4)  .06*** - .02 .004  .046*  .053***   -.007    .032      .050
P. want me to do well in Math + 3.54  .22  .06 (4.9)  .05** -.03 .088***  .120***  .035 *   -.077*** -.058***     .084
P. interested in Science(0-4) + 2.18  .34  .07 (3.6)  .02 .08*** .088***  .017   .179***   -.060***  .073      .065
Math Important to get Job(0-4) + 3.57  .21 -.01 ( .7) -.02 -.05** .106***  .049  .019   -.043*** -.099***     .054
Sci. Important to get Job(0-4) + 2.93  .33 -.05 (2.5) -.13*** -.20*** .183** -.019  .039   -.015   -.125***    .126
Math Useful Solving Everyday Pb. + 3.03  .31  .01 (0.6) - .05 .21*** .108***  .037  .103***   -.043**  -.146***     .095
Sci. Useful Everyday Life(0-4) + 2.46  .31  .06 (2.8) -.02 .17*** .141***  .075 -.140***    .013   -.179***     .114
Source: Regressions predicting the characteristics of 1366 to 1460 Canadian and American secondary schools.  Provinces with external exams
included in final course grade were Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec and the Francophone schools in New Brunswick.  Mean school
char. based on n gt 8.
